Yadnesh Salvi

Story · arXiv

When LLM Agents Negotiate: Private Information and Dynamic Bargaining in Supply Chains (arXiv)

paper · Story page

Nine LLMs negotiated 9,840 buyer-seller contracts against a game-theoretic benchmark. Agents captured 95.4% of first-best surplus, but slow bargaining eroded 21–34% of it, and baseline models accepted individually irrational contracts in 19.2% of cases.

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